

Exploring Different Approaches to Penetration Testing


Cara Marie

NCC Group ISSA-LA Aug 2017

Obligatory About Me

- NCC Group Principal Security Consultant Pentested numerous networks, web applications, mobile applications, etc.
- Hackbright Graduate
- Ticket scalper in a previous life
- @bones_codes | <u>cara.marie@nccgroup.com</u>

Not me, but sometimes I channel her;)





Why?

- 1. What are your most important assets in your company?
- 2. How would an attacker get access to them?

 Likely not through a single system or application probably through a combination of things
- 3. Hence Red Team




Red Team Benefits

- Understand the impact of a security breach
- Identify weaknesses in development and testing processes

- Test incident response capabilities
- Demonstrate security controls
 - justify security spending



Nobody likes a sad panda...





PROCEED
WITH CAUTION

Security Assessment Flavors




Vulnerability Assessment






Penetration Test





Red Team





Threat Model (environment, system, application, etc.)





Insider Threats


- Employee
- Third-party Contractor
- Client

- Deliberate / Malicious
- Compromised / Accidental



Trust your employees, but don't allow unrestricted access across the organization

Threat Model (environment, system, application, etc.)



Vulnerability Assessment

Vulnerability Assessment

Goals / Purpose

- Identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
- Prioritize these vulnerabilities for remediation

Exploitation is **NOT** a requirement






perating System Comparison Vulnerability Comp

Host Count Comparison

We Run [INSERT VULN SCANNER] We Don't Need A Pentest











Apache 2.2 < 2.2.15 Multiple Vulnerabilities

Gaps in Automated Vulnerability Scanning

- Ratings lack context
- Risk ratings can be wrong/misleading
- More noise than signal (if misconfigured)
- Encourages "set-and-forget"



_clock-skew: mean: -1s, deviation: 0s, median: -1s				ed user-set.		
		Scanne	d at 2017-07	-31 17:59:36 PDT	for 7s	- 2
Nmap scan report for 10.62.20.52						
Host is up, received <mark>u</mark> ser-set (0.0011s latency).		PORT	STATE		REASON	<u> 34</u>
Scanned at 2017-07-31 11:08:08 PDT for 876s		80/tcp			no-respon	se
Not shown: 72 filtered ports		135/tc	p filtered	msrpc	no-respon	se
Reason: 72 no-responses		139/tc	p filtered	netbios-ssn	no-respon	se
PORT <u>STATE</u> SERVICE REASON VERSION		443/tc	p filtered	https	no-respon	se
B0/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 126 Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5	5	445/tc	p filtered	microsoft-ds	no-respon	se
http-methods:		7343/t	cp filtered	SWX	no-respon	se
Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST		8081/t	cp filtered	blackice-icecap	no-respon	se
Potentially risky methods: TRACE			cp filtered		no-respon	_
http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5			cp filtered		no-respon	
http-title: IIS7				tungsten-https	no-respon	
135/tcp open msrpc? syn-ack ttl 126			tcp filtered		no-respon	
139/tcp open netbios-ssn? syn-ack ttl 126			tcp filtered		no-respon	
445/tcp open microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 126			tc <mark>p</mark> filtered		no-respon	_
8081/tcp open tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 126			tcp filtered		no-respon	
mcafee epo-agent: ePO Agent not found		1	•			
49153/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 126		Nmap s	can report f	or 172.16.50.50		
49154/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 126				ed user-set.		
49277/tcp open unknown syn-ack ttl 126				-31 17:59:36 PDT	for 7s	
l servic e unreco gnized despite returning data. If you know the servi	ce/version. please s					
it the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?		PORT	STATE	SERVICE	REASON	
	en	80/tcp			no-respon	se
SF:	(D	135/tc			no-respon	
SF:	\x	139/tc		netbios-ssn	no-respon	
SF:)%	443/tc			no-respon	
SF:	LD	445/tc		microsoft-ds	no-respon	
SF:	%r		cp filtered		no-respon	
SF:	es			blackice-icecap		
SF:				https-alt	no-respon	
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows			cp filtered		no-respon	
service into. 03. Windows, crt. epc./o.microsoft.windows				tungsten-https		
target-version.nmap	244,22		-pki-dev.nma		no-respon	12%
rai der- sei 21011 · 11111ah	244,22	23% quarys	- hvr - nev · IIIIIa	p 29,1		12%

Nmap scan report for 10.62.20.52

Host script results:

Threat Model (environment, system, application, etc.) **Penetration Test** 3 Vulnerability Assessment

Trust but

VERIFY




Penetration Test

Goals / Purpose

- Assess the risk of compromise
- Scoped to specific environment, system or application

Does **NOT** provide an accurate demonstration of incident response systems








Systems = Infra + App

PT = Systems (Discovery + Exploitation)



Default credentials + HTTP PUT method against */*

- excellent configuration ESPECIALLY when exposed to the Internet...

A Find external entry vulnerabilities

B. Find internal entry vulnerabilities

1. Gain any domain credentials to facilitate intel gathering on the network

2. Gain privileges of Local SYSTEM on Domain Member Servers

3. Traverse to different servers looking for powerful tokens & hashes

4. Steal tokens and hashes for powerful domain users & administrators

5. Use domain admin against Business

- Profit!




Red Team

Goals / Purpose

- Assess end-to-end modeling of real-world threat actor techniques, tactics and procedures
- Identify and emulate attack path(s)

Provides realistic assessment of incident response systems



^{*} Depending on the results of previous assessments

Red Team Phases

Attacker Modeled Pentest

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)



OSINT (Recon)

"...data collected from publicly available sources to be used in an intelligence context."



ATT XL MENS SHIRTS **EXCELLENT CONDITION** CASUAL DRESS WORK SHIRTS See original listing



Item condition: Pre-owned

Iten


阿克阿利阿阿	
Miller Liter Country (KCC) 1 Miller (KCC) 1 Mille	
PATRON TROUILA	
THE CHANGE THE PARTY OF THE PAR	
\$ 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1	
	L



ee details

d. Nov. 26 @





Red Team Phases

Attacker Modeled Pentest


- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- Social Engineering, i.e. phishing

One of the better (if not the best) social engineering attacks

Social Engineering

The clever manipulation of the natural human tendency to trust.





Why phishing?

100% of the time, phishing works everytime

- Gain an idea of risk
- Improve user awareness
- Test internal processes

Benefits Enrollment

Olick here to download pictures. To help protect your privacy, Outlook prevented automatic download of some pictures in this mes:

Sent: Wed 7/26/2017 8:51 PM

To:

Your organization has enrolled you within our benefits program. To complete this enrollment please use the link below, and please login with your normal credentials.


https://my.corp-benefits.org/index.html?logon=a7125f38-8cac-43e7-b96c-68155b9a003f

Once completed, you should receive a confirmation email within the next 48 hours with further details.

Kind Regards,

Benefits Enrollment Team

Corporate Benefits, Inc.



Red Team Phases

Attacker Modeled Pentest


- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- Social Engineering, i.e. phishing
- Physical Penetration Test (optional)



Getting In

The trick is to look the part, act like you belong — confidence gets you everywhere










Bypassing right to exit heat sensors from the wrong side

Red Team Phases


Attacker Modeled Pentest

- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- Social Engineering, i.e. phishing
- Physical Penetration Test (optional)
- Network Penetration Test (NPT)





Interesting deprecated service...



Red Team Roadmap







OSINT / Recon

Use Privileges


Profit

Social Engineering / Physical Intrusion

Escalate Privileges



```
root@kali:~/Desktop/CrackMapExec-2.3# python crackmapexec.py 192.168.100.100 -u pc -p P@ssw@rdl -d insecure.com --ntds drsuapi
10-09-2016 16:17:25 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl [*] Windows 6.3 Build 9600 (name:DCl) (domain:insecure.com)
10-09-2016 16:17:25 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl [*] Login successful insecure.com\pc:P@ssw@rdl
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl [*] Dumping NTDS.dit secrets using the DRSUAPI method (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl [*] Dumping NTDS.dit secrets using the DRSUAPI method (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a483285d68f94aee117b54d6c7df03d59:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ae974876d974abd805a989ebead8646:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCl insecure.com\pc:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75
```



^{*} Depending on the results of previous assessments

Conclusion

Drink the koolaid...

but only once the security program is mature enough to handle it.

Benefits Round 2 – The Final Round:

- Understand the impact of a security breach
- Identify weaknesses in development and testing processes
- Test incident response capabilities
- Demonstrate security controls
 justify security spending



Questions?

@bones_codes | cara.marie@nccgroup.com

